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JUDICIAL FAILURE TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS
LEGISLATION: AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF
CROCKETT v. REAGAN
MARK P. GIBNEY*
Since the early 1970s, with varying degrees of effort and
success, the United States has made human rights concerns a
part of its foreign assistance and foreign policy. The legal basis
for the pursuit of human rights goals can essentially be found in
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act.' Section 502B reads
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Purdue University. J.D., Villanova Uni-
versity, 1977; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1985.
1. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(1986). The development of § 502B to its present form gives a
good indication of how human rights concerns have been simultaneously accepted, and
rejected, by policymakers. The predecessor to § 502B was § 32 of the 1973 Foreign Assis-
tance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973). Section 32 recommended that the
President "deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign
country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for
political purposes." In 1974, § 502B of The Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-559,
88 Stat. 1795, 1815 (amended 1976) was added. Both § 32 and § 502B were only state-
ments of the "sense of Congress," and therefore not binding on the President. After
these provisions were ignored by the Nixon administration, Congress took steps to make
these provisions legally binding. Congress included language in both the 1975 Interna-
tional Development and Food Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849,
860 (1975), and a § 502B amendment in the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 729, 748 (1976), re-
quiring aid to be withheld if a nation had a record of gross violations of human rights.
President Ford vetoed the original, binding version of § 502B of the 1975 Foreign Assis-
tance Act, in which Congress deleted the "sense of the Congress" language. In early 1976,
Ford signed a compromise bill which replaced the "sense of the Congress" language with
an introduction stating that a rights-aid linkage was the "policy of the United States."
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
329, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 729, 748 (1976). The human rights language was strengthened in
1978 so that security assistance is now prohibited, absent "extraordinary circumstances,"
infra note 2, to any government with a pattern of gross human rights violations, 22
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1986). Congress has also mandated a rights-aid linkage for multilat-
eral economic assistance as well. International Financial Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
118, § 701, 91 Stat. 1067, 1069 (1977)(current version at 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982)). For a
good analysis of the development of human rights legislation see R. Cohen, Human
Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some Proposals for a Coordinated
Strategy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (D. Kommers and G. Loe-
scher ed. 1979)[hereinafter Cohen, Human Rights Decision-Making]. See also S. Cohen,
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in part: "Except under circumstances specified in this Section,
no security assistance may be provided to any country the gov-
ernment of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights."2
Notwithstanding the existence of the human rights legisla-
tion noted above,8 it is far from clear that human rights con-
cerns have in fact played a meaningful role in the provision of
foreign assistance.' Furthermore, a very strong case could be
Conditioning U.S. Assistance on Human Rights Practices,76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 246
(1982)[hereinafter Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Assistance].
2. Section 301(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 729, 748, as amended by the International Security Assistance Act
of 1978, 92 Stat. 730, 731. The escape clause that is provided, however, is that notwith-
standing the existence of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, as-
sistance might still be provided to a country if the President certifies that "extraordinary
circumstances" exist warranting the provision of such assistance. § 5021(a)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). The "extraordinary circum-
stances" language was added to § 502B(a)(2) by § 6(d)(1) of the International Security
Assistance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 730, 731.
3. Congress has also passed a variety of country-specific legislation, singling out na-
tions for their human rights practices. For example, in FY 1975 military aid to Chile was
prohibited, Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 25, 88 Stat. 1795, 1802
(1974), and the amount of aid requested for South Korea was substantially reduced. Id.
at § 26(a). Uruguay was denied military aid in the Foreign Assistance and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-441, § 505, 90 Stat. 1465, 1473 (1976).
The Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-148, § 503, 91 Stat. 1230, 1239 (1977) prohibited military assistance to Argentina,
Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay. This law also reduced the amount re-
quested for the Philippines, § 503C, 91 Stat. 1239, and eliminated funds for Nicaragua
and Paraguay although these countries were not specified, H.R. REP. No. 1546, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 31, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1878. In FY 1979,
an indefinite ban was placed on both military aid and arms sales to Argentina. Interna-
tional Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 11, 91 Stat. 614, 619-20
(1977), as amended by the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
384, § 12(c)(1), 92 Stat. 730, 737 (1978). At the end of 1981 the embargoes on security aid
to Argentina and Chile were modified to require that the President certify that these
governments were making "significant progress in complying with internationally recog-
nized principles of human rights" before assistance would be provided. International Se-
curity and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 725 and 726, 95
Stat. 1519, 1553-54 (1981). For a discussion of country-specific legislation see Cohen,
Conditioning U.S. Assistance, supra note 1, at 254-56. See also Moeller, Human Rights
and United States Security Assistance: El Salvador and the Case for Country-Specific
Legislation, 24 HARV. INT'L L. J. 75 (1983).
4. The two strongest pieces of evidence of this are provided by Cohen, Conditioning
U.S. Assistance, supra note 1, and Carleton & Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human
Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 205
(1985)[hereinafter Carleton & Stohl]. Cohen goes into great depth in depicting a State
Department bureaucracy where human rights concerns were virtually ignored during the
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made that various human rights laws have been violated. It is
this problem, and its possible solution, that will be addressed
here.
The focus of this article will be Crockett v. Reagan,5 a suit
brought by 29 Congressmen challenging U.S. military policy in
El Salvador as well as the security assistance provided to that
country. Part I examines the Crockett case and provides an al-
ternative approach to that taken by the court. Part II examines
the philosophical justification for human rights legislation. The
argument made in this section is that what has essentially been
missed thus far, by policymakers and judicial actors alike, is the
moral culpability that is involved when a nation provides sup-
port to an unjust regime. Part III explores the rationale for judi-
cial deference exhibited in Crockett. What is challenged is the
oft-relied upon idea that there are no "judicially discoverable
and manageable standards" for the court to employ in matters
involving foreign affairs.' The position taken here is that the ju-
diciary does in fact have available to it some data on human
rights conditions in other countries that could be used in subse-
quent challenges to the expenditure of U.S. security assistance.
Finally, Part IV examines the notion of the judiciary serving as a
forum for the "moral evolution"7 of American society.
Carter administration. The empirical work by Carleton and Stohl, discussed further, in-
fra notes 64-68 and accompanying text, indicates quite convincingly that with only a few
exceptions, the reality of the pursuit of human rights concerns has been decidedly differ-
ent from the high sounding rhetoric. But see Cingranelli & Pasquarello, Human Rights
Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries, 29 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 539 (1985). It should be pointed out that contrary to most of the empirical
work in this area, Cingranelli and Pasquarello generally find a negative correlation be-
tween human rights violations and the level of U.S. assistance. What makes this work
suspect, however, is that El Salvador is not included in the analysis.
5. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd. 720 F.2d 1355(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
6. Id. at 898. The court disagreed with the defendants on whether the issue involved
was a "type of political question which involve[d] potential judicial interference with
executive discretion in the foreign affairs field." Id. Instead, the court based its decision
on the view that the lack of employable judicial standards prevented judicial involve-
ment in this case.
7. The term is Michael Perry's. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 100-01 (1982). See also infra note 72.
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I. Crockett v. Reagan and Justiciability
The backdrop to Crockett v. Reagan is a brutal civil war in
El Salvador that has claimed the lives of over 40,000 civilians.8
The court in Crockett provided some background information
on the war, such as the antagonists,' but the opinion itself gives
no information about the conduct or the consequences of the
war. Crockett involved two main issues. The first involved the
nature of U.S. military activity in El Salvador, and whether the
activities of American servicemen violated the Constitution 0
and the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR)." The
second issue concerned whether the security assistance that the
United States has provided to El Salvador violated 502B.'3 The
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on both issues.
A. War Powers Claim
The basis of the plaintiffs' complaint involving the WPR
concerned the activities of 56 members of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The plaintiffs' factual claim was that these soldiers had
been coordinating the war effort of the Salvadoran government,
and were assisting in planning specific operations against the re-
bel forces. 13 Moreover, the plaintiffs also claimed that many of
these military personnel worked in or around areas where there
was heavy combat.14 The plaintiffs' claim was that such activi-
8. Bonner, Sandinistas Aren't the Worst, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1984, at A31, col. 1.
9. 558 F. Supp. at 895.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 11.
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1983). The WPR requires that absent a declaration of
war, a report must be made to Congress within 48 hours of any time when United States
armed forces have been introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and that 60 days
after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted, the President shall terminate
any use of United States armed forces unless Congress declares war, enacts specific au-
thorization for such use of United States armed forces, or extends the 60-day period for
an additional 30 days. The WPR issue in Crockett was whether such a report should
have been filed.
12. Bonner claims that as of 1984 the United States had spent over a billion dollars
in trying to prop up the Salvadoran government. Bonner, supra note 8.
13. 558 F. Supp. at 897.
14. Id. In support of its allegations, the plaintiffs submitted two articles describing
the activities of U.S. servicemen in El Salvador. The first article described U.S. military
personnel as "fighting side by side" with Salvadoran troops. The second article was
based on a General Accounting Office report which disclosed that U.S. military personnel
had been "drawing 'hostile fire pay,' and that a tentative Pentagon ruling that all of El
[Vol. IV
FAILURE TO ENFORCE
ties of U.S. servicemen violated the WPR.
The defendants' answer alleged that the U.S. military forces
in El Salvador have not acted as combat advisors,15 and have not
accompanied Salvadoran forces either in combat, in operational
patrols, or in any situation where combat was likely."6 The State
Department also stated that the U.S. military forces had not
been subject to attack. 17 Instead, the defendants alleged that the
only role that the U.S. military personnel played was to train
Salvadoran military units so as to create a "self-training capabil-
ity in particular skills." 8
The court readily recognized the vast discrepancies in the
factual allegations between the contending parties.
Plaintiffs present a significantly different picture of what
is actually occurring in El Salvador, and the relationship
of U.S. military personnel to it. Although consideration
of the merits might reveal disagreements about the
meaning of WPR terms such as "imminent involvement
in hostilities," the most striking feature of the pleadings
at this stage is the discrepancy as to the facts. 9
Not only are the factual allegations strikingly different, but
the court also recognized that implicit in the plaintiffs' claims
was the charge that the executive branch was distorting the real-
ity of U.S. involvement in El Salvador, and that if one believed
plaintiffs' assertions as true, one would find them "at a mini-
mum, disturbing. '2 0 However, having gone this far, the court
then beat a hasty retreat, granting the defendants' motion to
Salvador qualified as a 'hostile fire area' was reversed for 'policy reasons,' possibly to
avoid the necessity of reporting to Congress under the WPR." Id. at 897.
15. Id. One of the oddities of the State Department's position is that the bureaucrats
also guaranteed prospectively that no servicemen would do any of the activities they
were alleged to have done.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court notes a possible discrepancy even in the Executive's account. While
the State Department insisted that U.S. military personnel had not been subject to at-
tack, the court notes that the testimony of Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, Director
of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, does not exactly claim that American mili-
tary personnel had not been exposed to hostile fire.
18. Id. It is not exactly clear what these particular skills are.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 897-98. Indeed for the purpose of deciding the government's motion to dis-
miss, the court had to accept those allegations as true.
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dismiss the WPR claim on the ground that this is a nonjusticia-
ble question.2
There are several aspects of the court's treatment of the
WPR issue that need further consideration. Generally, the dis-
cussion that follows is premised on a notion that is not com-
monly accepted in legal scholarship or practice, namely, that
courts can play an important role in certain cases involving for-
eign affairs, and that they should not automatically exclude
themselves from such matters.22 This is not to argue that the
judiciary should play a role equal to the political branches; how-
ever, the working assumption being used here is that the other
avenue should not always be the rule either.23 The facts of a par-
ticular case should determine the judiciary's role.
The first problem to be addressed in Crockett is the vast
discrepancies in the factual allegations themselves, and the re-
sponse that this prompted for the court. As the court itself
pointed out, the parties' factual allegations were completely dif-
ferent.2 ' Moreover, the court also hinted at the possibility of Ex-
ecutive lying and manipulation.25 What is puzzling is why this
rather disturbing state of affairs did not elicit more concern
from the court.2"
Even if one accepted the notion that the judiciary should
tread slowly and softly when confronted with factual allegations
as diverse as those in Crockett, particularly by members of two
coordinate branches of government, what is missing in Crockett
21. Id. at 898.
22. The dominant view is best exemplified in Louis Henkin's work FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972). It should be noted that although the court in Crockett did
not employ the convenient "foreign affairs" shield, supra note 6, certainly the fact that
what was at issue in the case involved issues of international affairs was quite important
in the court's exhibiting the deference that it did.
23. How far-reaching "foreign affairs" can be taken is rather remarkable. For a dis-
cussion of how questions of "foreign affairs" become inextricably (and unfortunately)
linked with virtually any questions involving immigration policy, see Gibney, The Role of
the Judiciary in Alien Admissions, 8 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 341 (1985).
24. See supra text accompanying note 19.
25. Id. at 897-98. One might have to read between the lines to discern this, but the
court seemed more inclined to entertain the notion of distortion by the Executive than
by the plaintiff Congressmen.
26. It is ironic that the court mentions Vietnam, although in the context of showing a
situation where deciding the existence of America's involvement in that war would not
pose a political question. Of course, Vietnam could serve as an excellent example of the
distortion of U.S. military involvement, much like the plaintiffs' claim in Crockett.
[Vol. IV
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is any real attempt to clear up these "disturbing" factual dis-
crepancies. For this the court should be faulted. In fact, the
court quite easily depicts itself as completely unable to decipher
any disagreements in factual allegations.
Even if the plaintiffs could introduce admissible evidence
concerning the state of hostilities in various geographical
areas of El Salvador where U.S. forces are stationed and
the exact nature of U.S. participation in the conflict (and
this information may well be unavailable except through
inadmissible newspaper articles), the Court no doubt
would be presented conflicting evidence on those issues
by defendants. The Court lacks the resources and exper-
tise (which are accessible to the Congress) to resolve dis-
puted questions of fact concerning the military situation
in El Salvador."7
A related problem involves the court's treatment of the
plaintiffs' allegations given the defendants' motion to dismiss.2 8
As the court correctly points out, these factual allegations must
be treated as being true for the purposes of a motion to dis-
miss.2 9 However, after acknowledging this, the court then states
that it did not have the resources and expertise to make the
kinds of factual determinations that it thought it was being
asked to make.30 The point to be underscored here is that with
the defendants' motion to dismiss the court was not charged
with making these factual determinations at this point in the
proceedings. Again, the court's prospective treatment of the
facts and issues of the case was unwarranted.
An ironic feature of the court's treatment of the WPR claim
is that notwithstanding all of the court's language about judicial
incapacities here, the court also indicated that if Congress now
made a determination that a report under the WPR was war-
ranted, then the requisite "constitutional impasse appropriate
27. 558 F. Supp. at 898. It is not clear why the court believes that newspaper articles
would necessarily be inadmissible. In fact, newspaper accounts have served as a very
useful source of information for certain courts in the past. Paul v. INS, 521 F. 2d 194,
199 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Esperdy, 234 F. Supp. 611, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
28. 558 F.Supp. at 898.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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for judicial resolution would be presented. 3 1 What is unclear
about this position, admittedly dicta, is that the court would
presumably still be burdened by the same deficiencies in making
factual determinations that it presently thought it was suffering
from. Moreover, by waiting for a "constitutional impasse," the
court thereby raises the stakes, but at the same time increases
the likelihood of striking a blow at one branch of government.
Finally, the gravest problem with the court's position about
waiting for a declaration by Congress is that it evinces an atti-
tude that the judiciary should not rule certain government be-
havior as being unlawful until another branch, in this instance
Congress, so declares.
B. Foreign Assistance Act Claim
The second major issue raised by the plaintiffs in Crockett
was whether the security assistance provided by the United
States to El Salvador violated the provisions of Section 502B.
The plaintiffs' contention was that the government of El Salva-
dor had engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, and therefore, under
the provisions of 502B, should be denied security assistance.2
The defendants sought dismissal on the grounds of either the
political question doctrine, standing, equitable discretion, or the
lack of a private right of action. The court granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss using the equitable discretion doctrine.
Essentially, the court maintained that since Congress had not
objected to the President's certifications under Section 728 of
the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1981,1" the plaintiffs' dispute was with other legislators and not
the Executive branch.3 5
Again, closer examination of the court's actions is needed.
To begin, having used the political question doctrine as the basis
for dismissal of the War Powers claim, 36 on one level it is not
31. 558 F. Supp. at 899.
32. Id. at 902.
33. Id.
34. Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 728, 95 Stat. 1519, 1555-57 (1981)(codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2370 note (1982)).
35. 558 F. Supp. at 902.
36. Supra note 6 and accompanying text. In determining that plaintiffs' claim under
[Vol. IV
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clear why the court did not employ this same doctrine for the
502B claim as well. That is, the court could have remained en-
tirely consistent with the first portion of its opinion by simply
stating that the court was not in a position to make an indepen-
dent judgment regarding conditions in El Salvador, that Con-
gress has the expertise to make such determinations, and so
on.3 7 One apparent reason why the court did not employ the po-
litical question doctrine again, however, was that there is very
little that is subtle about the civil war in El Salvador. While the
court could maintain that it did not have the resources and ex-
pertise to find out exactly what a relatively small number of U.S.
military personnel were doing in El Salvador, it would have a
much harder time convincing anyone that it could not develop
an understanding of the general political, social, and military
conditions in El Salvador. 8
Without the political question doctrine to rely on, then, the
court found a rather convenient means of avoiding a factual de-
termination through the seldom used equitable discretion doc-
trine. At first glance the court's reasoning seems quite convinc-
ing. The court maintained that under Section 728 assistance to
El Salvador is
conditioned upon certification by the President, 30 days
after enactment and every 180 days thereafter, that the
government of El Salvador is making a concerted and sig-
the WPR lacked an employable judicially discoverable and manageable standard for res-
olution, the court was alluding to one of the several types of "political questions" deline-
ated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-
55(1939).
37. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. An example of the effective manner in which another court handled factual deter-
minations concerning El Salvador is Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D.
Cal. 1982):
In short, the violent conditions in El Salvador are a matter of public record and
are corroborated by all available accounts. The Court therefore believes that it
can take judicial notice of the following facts without having to "second guess"
the Executive Branch's analysis of events in El Salvador, as feared by defend-
ants: (1) El Salvador is currently in the midst of a widespread civil war; (2) the
continuing military actions by both government and insurgent forces create a
substantial danger of violence to civilians residing in El Salvador; and (3) both
government forces and guerrillas have been responsible for political persecution
and human rights violations in the form of unexplained disappearances, arbi-
trary arrests, torture, and murder.
Id. at 358.
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nificant effort to comply with internationally recognized
human rights, is achieving substantial control over all el-
ements of its own armed forces so as to bring an end to
the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citi-
zens by these forces, is making continued progress in im-
plementing essential economic and political reforms, in-
cluding the land reform program, and is committed to
the holding of free elections.3 9
The court pointed out that since its enactment, the President
had made two certifications under the Act,40 and that Congress
had taken no action to end aid to El Salvador under the Foreign
Assistance Act or by other means.
By way of responding to this contention, the plaintiffs asked
the court to examine independently the President's certification
of progress .4  The court declined to do so, claiming that "it is
clear that under these circumstances plaintiffs' dispute is pri-
marily with their fellow legislators who have authorized aid to El
Salvador while specifically addressing the human rights issue,
and who have accepted the President's certifications." '42
39. 558 F. Supp. at 902.
40. Id.
41. Id. ("Plaintiffs have asked the court to examine independently the President's
certifications of the progress of El Salvador's government in the human rights field,
which have been characterized by certain individual members of Congress as akin to
calling night day or a duck an eagle.") For a harsh critique of these Presidential certifica-
tions, see Horton & Sellier, The Utility of Presidential Certifications of Compliance
with United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Salvador, 1982 Wisc. L. REV.
825.
42. 558 F.Supp. at 902. It should be noted that Riegle v. Federal Open Market Com-
mittee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the case relied on by the court in Crockett for
support of the equitable discretion doctrine, offers a markedly different situation. Riegle
involved a question of standing in a suit brought by a U.S. Senator challenging the con-
stitutionality of the procedures of the Federal Reserve Act for the appointment of the
five federal bank members of the Federal Open Market Committee. In Riegle the court
established a two-part test for the equitable discretion doctrine: a court should dismiss a
congressional plaintiff's suit either when the legislator does not satisfy traditional stand-
ing requirements, or when she has standing but a legislative remedy is available and a
similar action could be brought by a private plaintiff. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878-79. Riegle
and Crockett differ in several important respects. While the plaintiffs in Riegle chal-
lenged executive branch actions that were carried out in accordance with a federal stat-
ute that had been passed by a majority in both houses of Congress, in Crockett what was
in dispute was the legality of executive branch activities in implementing legislation
rather than the legality of the legislation itself. In essence, the plaintiffs in Crockett were
not asking the court to circumvent the legislative process, as the court suggests; instead,
1986] FAILURE TO ENFORCE
What the court has ignored in its analysis, however, is the
force of 502B. The court can only avoid the 502B issue by treat-
ing Section 728 as if it supersedes 502B. Curiously enough, the
legislative history seems silent on this."3 While the court takes
special pains to give meaning to Section 728, it does not make a
similar effort with 502B, now rendered meaningless, at least in
terms of El Salvador. Sections 728 and 502B are not necessarily
in conflict, but in terms of human rights conditions in El Salva-
dor they are. While there is undoubtedly a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in
that country, it is also true that there appears to be some "pro-
gress" in El Salvador. That is to say, that while torture, assassi-
nation, and the imprisonment of individuals on political grounds
are rather commonplace, by at least some accounts they are
not as commonplace as they once were. Thus, there is arguably
the requisite "progress" for purposes of 728."'
the court was being asked to enforce existing legislation. In terms of the standing issue,
it is not clear that a private party would be able to show that human rights violations
occurring in another country caused her "distinct and palpable injury." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Where the decision in Crockett seems to lead is to a situation
where no party could challenge the expenditure of U.S. foreign assistance. This is a curi-
ous and unfortunate result. For an excellent discussion of the issues addressed in this
note, see Note, Constitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human Rights Legislation:
The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 163, 182-203 (1983).
43. S. REP. No. 83, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2404, 2467-68.
44. America's Watch has continually maintained that there has been no sign of im-
provement in the human rights conditions in El Salvador. For example, AMERICA'S
WATCH THE CONTINUING TERROR (Seventh Supplement to the REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EL SALVADOR)(1985) states:
Though our "Report" and its seven supplements have chronicled many
changes in the human rights situation, including significant reductions in some
forms of abuse, at no time has it been possible for us to assert that there was a
general improvement in human rights. To our regret, that remains true. Presi-
dent Duarte's civilian government notwithstanding, the human rights situation
in El Salvador remains terrible.
Id. at 1. See also Note, The Agony and the Exodus: Deporting Salvadorans in Violation
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 703, 719-24 (1986) (dis-
cussing the human rights reports of Tutela Legal).
45. Thomas Enders, formerly the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs, has emphasized that progress is by no means equated with absolute respect for
human rights. Certification Concerning Military Aid to El Salvador, Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-16 (1982) (prepared
statement of Thomas Enders). It should be noted that President Reagan's pronounce-
ment of a statistical decline in human rights violations in El Salvador has been vigor-
ously challenged. See id. at 73-76 (prepared statement of Morton Halperin, American
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Admittedly the existence of both 728 and 502B add confu-
sion to an area not marked by clarity. Moreover, in light of this,
in many respects El Salvador is not the best example of the gen-
eral proposition proposed here: that the judiciary should not re-
move itself so completely in challenges to the expenditure of
U.S. foreign assistance. The problem is that Crockett has been
treated as if it is settled law.4 Moreover, given the approach
taken in Crockett, perhaps no one could bring such a suit.47 This
result is unfortunate. The rest of this article will not only assert
why Crockett was erroneously decided, but it will also address
standards and rationales for prospective judicial treatment of
foreign assistance challenges.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The notion that moral concerns should play a part in a na-
tion's foreign policy is a recent phenomenon.4 s In fact, one only
needs to look as far back as the Nixon administration, particu-
larly Henry Kissinger's view of realpolitik, to see how moral con-
cerns were treated with open scorn and contempt.4' Despite this
attitude, perhaps because of it,50 the United States has passed
Civil Liberties Union).
46. See Constitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human Rights Legislation: The
Case of El Salvador, supra note 42 at 191-92 ("The determination in Crockett reveals
the improbability of judicial enforcement of human rights legislation.")(citations
omitted).
47. See also supra note 42.
48. Perhaps the most influential political philosopher espousing this position has
been Charles R. Beitz, see C.R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1979). Beitz has argued that the dominant amoral "Hobbesian" view of international
affairs has ignored the interrelationship between nation-states that exists in the world
order. See also B. BARRY, RICH COUNTRIES AND POOR COUNTRIES (forthcoming); H. SHUE,
BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980); T. NARDIN, LAW,
MORALITY. AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983).
49. For a good account of Kissinger's refusal to acknowledge congressional efforts to
promote human rights see Cohen, Human Rights Decision-Making, supra note 1, at 217-
22.
50. Sandy Vogelgesang attributes the surge in concern for human rights to several
factors, among them: a proud tradition in this country concerning itself with human
rights, domestic reaction to the American involvement in Vietnam, the spillover from the
civil rights movement, and changes within Congress concerning the relationship between
Congress and the Executive branch and the conduct of foreign affairs. Vogelgesang, Do-
mestic Policies Behind Human Rights Diplomacy, in TOWARD A HUMANITARIAN DIPLO-
MACY: A PRIMER FOR POLICY 49-92 (T.J. Farer ed. 1980).
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the human rights provisions that exist today."1
What is not exactly clear about U.S. human rights policy,
apart from its inconsistent application, is the philosophical basis
for the policy itself. What seems to be the driving force behind
the moves to include moral concerns in U.S. foreign policy is the
rather simple notion that it is morally wrong to support unjust
regimes, and therefore the U.S. government ought not to do so.
The following remarks by President Jimmy Carter reflect this
idea.
In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assis-
tance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest af-
finities are with nations which commit themselves to a
democratic path to development. Toward regimes which
persist in wholesale violations of human rights, we will
not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend
that our relations are unaffected.2
The argument that will be made here is that this notion
that it is morally wrong to provide aid to unjust regimes, while
commendable, does not give an accurate portrayal of the deeper
moral issues involved in such cases. Instead, what is missing
from such accounts is the notion of moral culpability in support-
ing unjust regimes." I have examined this point in much greater
51. See supra notes 1 and 3.
52. 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dept. St. Bull. 1
(1979) (statement by President Jimmy Carter). The ambivalence in the President's
statement is also reflected in the following passage from the Fraser Report:
The human rights factor is not accorded the high priority it deserves in our
country's foreign policy. . . .Unfortunately, the prevailing attitude has led the
United States into embracing governments which practice torture and un-
abashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced by the world
community.
[. A higher priority] for human rights in foreign policy is both morally
imperative and practically necessary.
The State Department too often has taken the position that human rights is
a domestic matter. . .. When charges of serious violations of human rights do
occur, the most that the Department is likely to do is make private inquiries and
low-keyed appeals to the government concerned.
HOUSE SUBCOM. ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS & MOVEMENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP,, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974).
53. James Moeller's treatment of the moral culpability issue is quite unique. Moeller,
supra note 3. One of the advances he sees in country-specific legislation, such as §728 of
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detail elsewhere,54 but the position can be summarized as fol-
lows. When one nation provides military arms and security assis-
tance to another nation,5 and the recipient nation pursues poli-
cies that violate the human rights of individuals, then the nation
providing aid is morally responsible for the unjust practices of
the receiving nation if the donor nation knew or should have
known of such practices. 6 Essentially this position is stating
that nations cannot provide aid to other nations but then sepa-
rate themselves from the negative human consequences of pro-
viding such "aid. '57 The domestic examples of such a principle
abound. For example, an individual who aids and abets in the
commission of a crime is held at least partly responsible for the
the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
113, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981), as opposed to § 502B, is that the latter promotes the notion of
moral culpability, while Moeller feels the former does not. Implicit in this kind of analy-
sis is the idea that a nation can simply avoid moral culpability by merely not mentioning
such culpability in the legislative goals. This position, of course, is quite untenable.
Moeller also misses the point that "progress" in human rights does not necessarily
equate with the absence of moral and legal wrongs. El Salvador would be an excellent
example of this.
54. M. GIBNEY, STRANGERS OR FRIENDS: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW ALIEN ADMISSION POL-
icy (1986) (see generally ch.7).
55. It should be noted that the form that assistance takes can be quite important in
determining moral culpability. For example, a donor nation would not have the same
moral responsibility for harms caused when it was providing food, say, to another coun-
try, as opposed to providing instruments of terror and torture.
56. Douglas MacLean has taken a similar position:
Certainly where we are responsible for having brought repressive regimes to
power, we share complicity in their wrongdoings. Some of these cases, where our
aid is necessary for their remaining in power, are morally equivalent to cases
where we ourselves are the proximate cause of human rights violations. No
doubt, awareness of U.S. complicity in such cases is one of the principal explana-
tions for the current popularity of the human rights movement.
MacLean, Constraints, Goals, and Moralism, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
98 (P. Brown and D. MacLean ed. 1979).
57. Moeller, supra note 3, presents a zero sum game between having an effective
source of diplomatic leverage on the one hand and a possible implication in the viola-
tions of human rights by recipient nations, at least under § 502B, on the other hand. The
issue of diplomatic leverage is used repeatedly, and is subject to considerable debate.
The point that needs to be underscored here, however, is that just because a nation does
not meet some of its moral responsibilities it does not have license to avoid all obliga-
tions. The point made in this article is that the United States ought not to provide
security assistance to a ruling regime in El Salvador that is unjust. Assuming, however,
that it does so continue, the U.S. should not ignore its moral duties to those who thereby
suffer in the pursuit of certain foreign policy goals by this country. This point is ex-
amined at length in M. GIBNEY, supra note 54, at ch.7.
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commission of that crime. 8 The same kind of principle should
apply in the international realm. It is interesting to note that
one rationale for the "softness" in the implementation of human
rights legislation is that to do so would be to embarrass an ally.
What is being suggested here is that the donor should similarly
suffer embarrassment, and, more importantly, moral censure. In
fact, the nonrecognition of human rights violations in other
countries can be attributed as much to a desire by the donor
country to avoid culpability for its own actions of support.
III. AVAILABLE STANDARDS
In part I of this article, the judiciary's deference to the po-
litical branches was explored in the context of Crockett v. Rea-
gan. One of the court's rationales for granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss-explicit in the WPR issue, implicit in the
502B issue-was that there were no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards on military, political, and social condi-
tions in El Salvador. The argument that will be made in this
section is that there are standards that could be used by a court
in situations where the expenditure of U.S. foreign assistance is
challenged. The past few years has seen a veritable explosion of
information concerning human rights conditions in other coun-
tries. The most notable of these, for the present analysis, are the
annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published
by the State Department, and the yearly Amnesty International
reports.
The larger point is that the judiciary should not prevent any
and all challenges to the expenditure of U.S. foreign assistance,
as the court in Crockett has done. This is not to call for judicial
interference in the political processes, but simply to point out
the need for the judiciary to assume its traditional role as a
check on the other two branches of government. What gives
added impetus for this judicial involvement is the moral blind-
ness discussed in the previous section, which may or may not be
rectified by a more alert judiciary.
58. W. LAFAVE & A. ScovT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL LAW 495-512 (1972).
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A. State Department Reports
The information contained in the State Department Re-
ports are noteworthy to the present analysis for two reasons.
The first is simply the fact that there is a wealth of information
about human rights conditions in other countries, in a format
that should be quite accessible to a judge. The second notewor-
thy feature is that it is a coordinate branch of government that
is providing this information. If the court in Crockett had ex-
amined the State Department Report for El Salvador in 1982,11
there might have been some evidence of "progress," 60 but also
very strong indications of systematic abuses of human rights.
Serious human rights problems continued in El Salvador
in 1982, despite signs of improvement throughout the
year. Incidents of political assassinations, killings of civil-
ians, disappearances, and torture continue to be reported,
although at substantially lower levels than in 1981 ...
Violence in El Salvador is endemic. Political polari-
zation has exacerbated the levels of violence. Extremes of
the right and the left regularly utilize assassination to
eliminate and terrorize suspected opposition members
and their sympathizers ...
There was a significant decrease in civilian deaths
attributed to political violence in 1982. This decrease fol-
lows the downward trend identified in the latter half of
1981. The average of 445 deaths per month (as measured
by press reports) in 1981 fell to an average of 219 deaths
per month during 1982. While it is certain that these
figures underreport the actual incidence of political vio-
lence, they do reflect trends. Supporting evidence of the
decline in political violence can be derived from reports
in the press of disappeared persons, some of whom un-
doubtedly were killed. These dropped from an average of
160 per month in 1981 to 38 in 1981. ...
Torture by elements of the Salvadoran armed forces,
and on occasion by guerilla forces, does occur. It is not
possible to establish the prevalence of torture because
59. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982
(Feb. 1983) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 1982].
60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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valid and systematic means for documenting cases do not
exist. Some elements of the security forces engage in the
use of psychological and physical coercion to extract in-
formation from suspected leftists. There is evidence that
on these occasions the use of terror has been prolonged
and extreme.6 '
B. Amnesty International Reports
A second source of information on human rights conditions
in other countries, perhaps a more highly respected source, are
the country reports provided by Amnesty International. Again,
such information is quite accessible to members of the judici-
ary.2 The Amnesty International country report on El Salvador
for 1982 would have included the following information.
Amnesty International continued to receive reports of ar-
bitrary arrests, abductions and subsequent "disappear-
ances", torture, and extra-legal executions. Persistent re-
ports of the involvement of the official security forces in
these violations of human rights led Amnesty Interna-
tional to send a fact-finding mission to Central America
in August 1981. Testimony from refugees in Honduras,
Costa Rica, Mexico and the United States of America
61. COUNTRY REPORTS 1982, supra note 59, at 490-95. The report, CRITIQUE: REVIEW
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982
(Feb. 1983), published by America's Watch, criticizes the 1982 State Department Report
for El Salvador in this way:
Using Salvadoran press sources (which essentially reprint official military
figures), and considering these a valid basis for data even on rural areas, the
Country Report concludes: "There was a significant decrease in political violence
in 1982." Reporting by human rights organizations in El Salvador also shows a
decline in reported, verified civilian political deaths, but these reports are neces-
sarily incomplete, as violence has been concentrated in rural areas off-limits to
human rights monitors (as well as the press). It is quite impossible in such cir-
cumstances to estimate the number of innocent dead, and misleading to state
categorically that their numbers have declined. The most important fact about
political murder, as well as disappearance and torture, in El Salvador in 1982, is
that these practices continued at levels which would defy belief were we not by
now so accustomed to the incidence of atrocity.
Id. at 38.
62. The court in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D.Cal. 1982), used
both the State Department Reports on El Salvador and Amnesty International Reports
to arrive at its conclusions about the anarchy and violence in El Salvador.
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confirmed accounts received by Amnesty International
that identified regular security and military units as re-
sponsible for widespread torture, mutilation and killings
of noncombatant civilians from all sectors of Salvadoran
society. 3
C. Carleton and Stohl
An additional source for data on human rights conditions in
other countries is the empirical work done by David Carleton
and Michael Stohl. These two political scientists have catego-
rized countries accepting U.S. military and economic assistance
according to the level of human rights violations in these coun-
tries. 4 Carleton and Stohl have used three sources of data: the
63. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982, at 133 (1982)(covering the period January
to December 1981).
64. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, employ a "political terror" scale first suggested
by Raymond D. Gastil in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1980) [hereinafter FREEDOM HOUSE YEARBOOK OF 1980]. The Carleton and Stohl scale
goes from a "just" situation on one extreme, to a situation of gross human rights viola-
tions on the other extreme. Part of the calculus is based on a schema first suggested in
the FREEDOM HOUSE YEARBOOK OF 1980:
Five levels of political terror are distinguished. The most general criterion is the
extent to which the people live under a recognizable and reasonably human rule
of law. Countries on Level A live under a secure rule of law, people are not
imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional (though police and
prison brutality may occur). Political murders are extremely rare. There is no
detention without trial, and laws protect individual and group rights. On Level B
there is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. How-
ever, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional, and psychiat-
ric institutions are not used to silence political opponents. Political murder is
rare, or, if present, characteristic of small terrorist organizations. On Level C
there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprison-
ment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common. Un-
limited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted. Incarcera-
tion in mental hospitals and the involuntary use of strong drugs may supplement
imprisonment. On Level D the practices of Level C are expanded to larger num-
bers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life in some
societies at this level. In others there is large-scale incarceration of ideological
opponents in labor camps or reeducation centers. In still others the terror may
stem primarily from the arbitrary and capricious manner in which opponents are
punished. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those
who interest themselves in politics or ideas. On Level E the terrors of Level D
have been extended to the whole population, and may result from religious, eth-
nic, or ideological fanaticism. The leaders of these societies place no limits on
the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
The worst periods of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia characterize countries on
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Freedom House "civil rights" scale, the State Department Re-
ports, and the Amnesty International Reports. The authors
coded the data presented in the reports as if they were accurate
and complete, so that any biases exhibited in the annual reports
should be evident in the indices.6 5
The uniqueness of the Carleton and Stohl coding scheme is
that rather than attempting to employ a narrative account of
human rights conditions in other countries, as one would find
with both the State Department and Amnesty International Re-
ports, they have, instead, used the data to compile ordinal mea-
sures. The authors write:
We are reasonably comfortable with the results because
of the high level of intercoder reliability in constructing
these indices. While they provide us with ordinal mea-
sures only, we are confident that the nations that are
scored as having the highest rankings are those nations
which in the reports of our two sources are responsible
for higher numbers of deaths, torture, and political im-
prisonment than those below them, and that the study
can be replicated.6
According to Carleton and Stohl, in 1982 (the year that
Crockett was decided) El Salvador is coded as a "4" under the
State Department Reports6 7 and'a "5" under the Amnesty Inter-
Level E.
FREEDOM HOUSE YEARBOOK OF 1980, at 37. Under the Carelton & Stohl analysis, Level A
corresponds a "1," the most just state of affairs, while on the other extreme, level E
corresponds to the number "5." See Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, at 212-13.
65. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, at 213.
66. Id. The Carleton and Stohl findings are quite surprising and disturbing. In terms
of the Carter administration, there are no negative correlations at the .05 level (the stan-
dard level of analysis), between the level of human rights violations in a country receiv-
ing U.S. aid and the amount of aid received, no matter which scale was used. Contrary to
the public perception of the Carter administration, the authors conclude of that period:
"In many cases there is a positive relationship between aid and human rights violations:
the more abusive a state was, the more aid it received." Id. at 215. The Reagan adminis-
tration record is more complex. The authors note that there were in fact the hoped for
(and legally mandated) negative correlations between human rights violations and the
amount of U.S. aid for 1982 and 1983, but only under their coding of the State Depart-
ment reports, and not for either the Freedom House scale or the Amnesty International
country reports. In light of these discrepancies, the authors echo some of the claims of
possible political biases in the State Department reports. Id. at 217-18.
67. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, at 227. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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national data.6 8 The conclusion to be drawn from both sets of
data, simply stated, is that in 1982 the United States provided a
large amount of aid69 to a government that committed large-
scale terror on its own population. Aid to such a regime, it has
been argued here, is unlawful because it violates the provisions
of 502B. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, such aid
makes the U.S. government morally culpable for the human
rights violations committed by the recipients of such aid. Given
these unlawful and immoral actions, the judiciary's role as a "fo-
rum of principle '7 0 will now be explored.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
One of the purposes of this article is to argue that the judi-
ciary could, and should, play a meaningful role in prospective
challenges asserting violations of 502B.71 It was argued in the
last section that there is data on human rights conditions in
other countries, data very accessible to the judicial branch. Such
data should not be ignored.
The focus of this section will be on the courts not as a legal
check, but as a moral check, perhaps a moral vanguard. The idea
of the judiciary serving in such a capacity has recently been de-
fended by Ronald Dworkin.
Judicial review insures that the most fundamental issues
of political morality will finally be set out and debated as
issues of political principle and not simply as issues of
political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in
any case not fully, within the legislature itself.72
68. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, at 227.
69. According to the State Department Report for that year, supra note 59, at 506,
the United States provided El Salvador over 264 million dollars in 1982.
70. The term comes from Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 469 (1981).
71. Analysis of another country might make this point clearer. In 1982 the United
states provided Zaire over 34 million dollars, 10 million in military and 24 million in
economic assistance. According to the Carleton and Stohl coding for that country, the
State Department data has Zaire at the level of "3," and the Amnesty International
country report has it at a "4." Carleton & Stohl, supra note 4, at 228. The point being
made in this article is that such assistance is violative of § 502B, and that there should
be some mechanism whereby such practices can be challenged.
72. Dworkin, supra note 70 at 517. See also M. PERRY. supra note 7. Perry argues
that a polity's "moral evolution" is not consonant with the goals and incentives that
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Dworkin's position does not necessarily mean that the judi-
ciary is necessarily imbued with greater moral insight than the
political branches. Instead, under Dworkin's view, the courts are
to ensure that matters of principle are not separated and re-
moved from political considerations.
What needs to be made clear is that while some, perhaps
most, issues concerning "foreign affairs" do not involve moral is-
sues, there are other foreign affairs issues that are unmistakenly
issues of a moral nature. Furthermore, it is asserted here that
there is a moral component to a policy of foreign assistance to a
nation that commits widespread human rights abuses on its citi-
zenry." Congress has, to a limited extent, recognized the moral
implications of such aid. It has been suggested here that the ju-
diciary might play an important role in foreign affairs matters
quite generally by raising moral questions where appropriate,
and perhaps by leading the nation in answering them.
CONCLUSION
The United States has proclaimed itself committed to
human rights. Moreover, it has passed legislation over the past
decade to promote such concerns. Despite these well publicized
efforts, it is indeed questionable whether the United States gov-
ernment has in fact been following the dictates of such human
rights legislation.
This article has been critical of the court's handling of
Crockett v. Reagan, a lawsuit brought by a group of Congress-
men challenging the activities of U.S. servicemen in El Salvador,
as well as U.S. assistance to that country. Focusing on the sec-
legislators operate under. As a result, Perry asserts that the vigorous reevaluation of
moral conventions so necessary in a Liberal society such as ours would be better per-
formed by the judicial branch.
73. A related rationale for further judicial scrutiny of certain foreign affairs issues is
that those who are affected by the policies of the political branches have absolutely no
input into, or representation by, either of those branches of government. To use equal
protection terminology, citizens of another country who suffer negative consequences
from the pursuit of U.S. national policy goals are, in a very real sense, a "suspect" class.
One would hope that the interests of this class would be recognized by the political
branches in this country, but certainly there are no assurances of this. The U.S. Supreme
Court has provided a special protection for suspect classes domestically, and it is sug-
gested here that, to one degree or another, it should extend similar kinds of protection
for suspect classes living elsewhere.
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ond issue, the position taken here is that the courts have availa-
ble the kind of data that could make for meaningful judicial par-
ticipation concerning these vital questions. This is also to say
that the judiciary should not be the kind of hesitant player that
the court in Crockett was. This is not to say that the judiciary
should usurp the role to be played here by the political
branches. However, courts should not simply look the other way
in the face of systematic violations of the law. Either such laws
should be repealed, or the courts should hold the political
branches to their own standards. Finally, it has been argued
here that the support of human rights violations in other coun-
tries implicates the donor of such aid in the unjust practices. It
has been asserted here that the judiciary has a unique role to
play in injecting moral concerns into policy considerations.
